In December 2009, the California Energy Commission ("CEC") adopted on-mode standards for power consumption of televisions, (e.g., watts used) which will go into effect in 2011. Proposed standards are subject to Section 25402(c) of the California Public Resources Code ("CPRC") which requires that proposed regulations must "not result in any added total costs to the consumer over the designed life of the appliances concerned." In order to comply with the CPRC, in September 2009, the CEC issued a report alleging consumers would save $8.1 billion from reduced energy consumption. We find that the CEC study is critically flawed and that contrary to their conclusions, California consumers are likely to be economically harmed by the proposed regulations. Inasmuch as the CEC proposed regulations go into effect in 2011 and have been cited as a model for the rest of the country, our results have important legal, economic, policy and regulatory implications for California and the United States as a whole.
III. THE CEC'S ATTEMPT TO REGULATE ENERGY CONSUMPTION

I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between pro-environmental policies and market performance gained momentum as an important topic of economic research in the early 1990's. There were those studies that demonstrated regulation can induce innovation, create competitive advantage for some regulated firms, and create domestic efficiencies and comparative advantage for US firms. 1 That optimism must be considered against opposing arguments that regulation actually reduces innovation and firm competitiveness. 2 Moreover, research on similar types of ecologically-motivated regulation has shown that alternative approaches are often superior to outright regulation. For example, one study finds that a gasoline tax would produce greater fuel savings than increases in the corporate average fuel-economy ("CAFE") standards, by encouraging people to drive less, and eventually to choose more-fuelefficient vehicles. 3 This is the fundamental paradox that should be addressed in any attempt to regulate digital televisions in California.
In California, the consumption of energy by certain appliances and equipment is regulated, in part, by the Appliance Efficiency Regulations ("AER"). regulations are designed by the California Energy Commission ("CEC") and impose standards of power consumption (e.g., watts used) for consumer appliances (e.g., refrigerators), subject to Section 25402(c) of the California Public Resources Code ("CPRC") which states that standards must be "feasible" and "attainable" and must "not result in any added total costs to the consumer over the designed life of the appliances concerned."
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In other words, the total cost to consumers of the regulations, over the life of the regulated appliance, must be non-positive (i.e., the present value of consumer expenditures savings must be greater than the cost of compliance), or put another way, must be consumer net-neutral.
In April 2008, the CEC indicated its plans to establish regulations for the power consumption of digital televisions, and in its Scoping Order, the CEC's Efficiency In addition to the likely negative fiscal impact on consumers, there are indications that innovation in display technologies may be negatively impacted as manufacturers are prevented or discouraged from developing or bringing new features to market.
For example, suppose a manufacturer developed a paper thin digital television technology which cost pennies to produce yet was energy inefficient. Although consumers would have high demand for such a television, the regulations would preclude the R&D investment necessary being made in the first place. This example is grounded in reality; it is our understanding that had the proposed regulations been in place earlier, plasma DTVs would not have been invested in by industry as a plausible concept. 12 It is beyond the scope of this paper (and we would suggest this is true of the CEC as well) to predict what future innovations may be precluded due to the proposed regulations.
II. THE EVIDENCE AND REASONS PROFFERED FOR THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS ARE MISLEADING
The CEC attempts to motivate the need for television energy efficiency regulatory standards by indicating that television viewing (including programming recording and playback) currently represents eight percent of residential electricity usage and that power consumption is growing rapidly and consequently needs to be regulated.
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One of the primary motivating factors behind the CEC's regulatory efforts is the stylized fact (asserted in the PG&E report) that the total number of TVs in use is increasing and therefore power consumption is increasing. 14 We do not dispute the increased number of televisions in use. However, in evaluating the resulting increase on power consumption, one should consider the benefits of the replacement effect (i.e., gains caused by the replacement of inefficient CRT televisions with predominantly LCD technology).
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As one can see from Figure 1 , a simple modeling exercise with conservative assumptions illustrates that while energy costs and consumption are increasing due to consumers watching more television on larger screens, the offset due to efficient technology actually keeps energy costs to consumers constant over time. See
Appendix A for a complete breakdown of costs and inputs by year. These results demonstrate that the CEC's claims that larger screen sizes necessitate energy control and regulation are tenuous at best.
A. THE CEC DISTORTS ENERGY CONSUMPTION FORECASTS
The CEC relied upon PG&E's analysis of the Energy Information Administration TVs account for 10 percent of household electricity and their energy consumption rate is increasing 8 percent annually.
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It should be noted that these inaccurate comments made by the CEC and EDF have gone uncorrected in the record.
III. THE CEC'S ATTEMPT TO REGULATE ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN TELEVISIONS IS CONTRARY TO FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
16 PG&E CASE study, page 9, section 4. In the television market, we can predict that if there are a small number of firms, prices will rise to cover the cost of research and development until an efficient innovation can be produced. In an unregulated market, competition for a "dominant design" is already in place, as firms must continually adapt to the stay in the industry and maintain market share. is(are) competitive and pricing is therefore effectively constrained to be where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 23 Consequently, were manufacturers able to make more energy-efficient sets at no cost, they would already be compelled to do so. 24 In short, if a feature is desirable to consumers and costs the manufacturer nothing (or more precisely costs less than the manufacturer can charge) a rational profit-seeking manufacturer would introduce such a feature and attempt to capture some of the gained economic benefit.
Second, the market already corrects for energy usage through pricing. It has been demonstrated that energy efficiency is a feature that consumers want. In economic terms, consumers will pay extra for televisions that use less energy. For example, from the fact that, given the gross rate of return, their expected sales are not sufficiently large to allow them to cover these costs." This implies that if firms are forced into innovation many of the smaller, less prosperous manufacturers will leave the market due to the costs of competition and in turn market concentration will increase. Syrneonidis (1996), page 58. 23 Marginal cost is the manufacturer's cost of producing one additional unit. In a competitive market with intense price competition, any company setting a price above marginal cost will be undercut, and thereby lose their market share. Thus prices will be bid down to meet marginal cost, which is beneficial to consumers. In theory, given full information as to energy consumption costs, high energy usage televisions need to sell at a discount relative to comparable low energy usage televisions, since otherwise consumers would not buy them. 26 The point is that the price mechanism already gives television manufacturers the incentive to develop energy efficient models. This is consistent with indications that energy usage innovations are ongoing for practically every company in the television market.
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The following example is illustrative. Suppose a component could be added to a television which reduces the lifetime energy consumption of a television by $50. If the cost of manufacturing the component is less than $50, the component will be added to the television (and if it is greater than $50 it will not be). Assuming that the component costs $30 to make, new models will include it. In this case, an extra $20 of surplus is generated by the energy saving innovation. The cost of the component will be added to the sale price, and the amount will be between $30 and $50, so that manufacturers and consumers will split the $20 surplus (e.g., if $40 is added to the 25 BroadcastEngineering, "Consumer's want 'green' TVs, electronics", December 16, 2008. 26 Percy's and Energy Star: "Working together for you and the environment", http://www.percys.com/t-estar-products.aspx. Note: It is our understanding that the FTC is in the process of requiring energy use disclosures for televisions and other electronics. This requirement would effectively convey full information to the market regarding energy consumption costs. 27 See e.g., Appendix F of the April 2, 2008 PG&E Title 20 Standards report; and According to Panasonic's AVC Networks Group President, Toshihiro Sakamoto, "Power reduction will come in two ways. One, Panasonic will reduce the number of components in plasmas, which need more components than LCD TV. Two, Panasonic will try to detect more of the light coming from the light source to the screen itself." Greentech Media, "Venture Power in Japan: Green Electronics", December 29, 2008.
sale price, consumers and manufacturers will each benefit by $10). Consequently there is a direct link between energy conservation and financial incentives to innovate, since both manufacturers and consumers benefit from technological advancements.
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From this example we can understand the effects of the CEC regulation. As the market stands now, televisions efficiently (in a financial sense) incorporate energy usage components. The CEC regulations (either 2011 or 2013) would require that economically inefficient components be added to existing televisions.
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In the example above, this would mean that the additional component would cost more than $50 to save consumers $50; i.e., the net effect is not a positive surplus generated, but rather a "deadweight loss" (negative surplus) as economists call it. Figure 4 graphically illustrates this loss. 28 Note that programs such as Energy Star and the FTC's EnergyGuide program reinforce and promote such innovation. 29 Consider a television which would be banned under the SDR proposed Title 20 Standards. If a company wants to bring it to market, additional energy savings components will need to be added (assuming such components exist). If adding the component were efficient (in a financial sense), the television would already include it, so we infer that adding it is not efficient include these components, pass the cost (and benefits) on to the consumer, and share in some of the surplus with the consumer. Conversely, the points above the blue 45 degree line represent inefficient components, that is, those which cost more than the benefits they provide. In the example mentioned with the $30 component which provides $50 of benefit, the green line shows the additional $20 of surplus generated.
As we have shown, additional components added as a result of imposed standards will necessarily be in the upper region, since their costs outweigh their benefits (otherwise they would have been added without the impetus of regulations). The red line shows components which cost more than they generate in added value; thus these are inefficient.
IV. THE CEC ESTIMATED SAVINGS OF $8.1 BILLION IS PREDICATED ON MATH/LOGIC ERRORS AND FLAWED
ASSUMPTIONS -EXPECTED "SAVINGS" ARE LIKELY NEGATIVE
The CEC based its estimated present value of overall energy savings on the GWh/yr in large part on the analysis contained in the PG&E Revised CASE Study; see Exhibit 1. 30 The Revised CASE Study was misinterpreted and then incorrectly utilized by CEC in their present value computation.
A. CEC INCORRECTLY USES 6.5 TWH AS ITS ANNUAL ENERGY SAVINGS ESTIMATE
The CASE study reports annual incremental energy savings, which cumulate to 6.5
TWh/yr after complete stock turnover in 2022. 31 In other words, annual savings are 6.5 TWh/yr only in the final year of the study -2022. The CEC misinterprets this finding and concludes that annual cost savings for each year between 2011 and 2022 are 6.5 TWh/yr. The correct application of the CASE study (assuming one agrees with that study's findings in the first place) is to compute the cumulative year on year energy savings in a step-wise fashion. Failing to do so causes the CEC to grossly overstate the amount of energy savings from the proposed regulation.
Simply correcting this error reduces the estimated $8.1 billion in savings to $3.5 billion; see Exhibit 2.
30 See PG&E Revised CASE study. July 3, 2008. Page 17. That the CEC misinterpreted and misapplied the CASE report is an incontrovertible fact. It is very troubling that at no point of the regulatory proceedings did the CEC see fit to acknowledge this error or amend their analysis. To the contrary, in its final response to industry, the CEC reiterated: "The Energy Commission estimated from information in the record that the statewide benefit from the proposed efficiency standards for televisions will result in an energy savings of 6,515 GWh/yr which will result in a direct energy cost savings to consumers of 8.1 billion dollars" and concluded by saying " [t] here is no mathematical error in the analysis. CEA and its allies have not identified any error."
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B. CEC USES AN UNREASONABLE DISCOUNT RATE TO FIND THE NET PRESENT VALUE OF ENERGY COST SAVINGS
The discount rate used should reflect the consumer's cost of capital, effectively conduct such a study (after all it is the burden of the CEC to satisfy the requirement that all proposed regulation be consumer neutral). In the absence of such an analysis, one can nevertheless posit a reasonable discount rate based on certain known facts.
First, consumer borrowing rates for the purposes of purchasing a television can be assumed to be between the long-term debt on depreciable assets (e.g., car loans) and short term debts (e.g., credit card debt). In California, the average interest rate paid on credit card debt by consumers is approximately 13.05%. On October 14, 2009, Bank of America showed automobile interest rates ranging between 4.5% and 9.75%
(this is likely too low for consumer electronics products but no better comparator is readily available). 34 Second, the equity premium (the amount above the risk free rate) is approximately 6%.
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Given that 30-year constant maturity US treasuries currently yield approximately 4%, the opportunity cost of investing in the market can be taken as approximately 10%.
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Given these data points, there is little doubt that the appropriate discount rate to apply is at least 10%. This is likely conservative, but the CEC should determine a precise rate by computing the actual average consumer cost of capital for California.
The application of this more appropriate (and still conservative) 10% discount rate to the corrected projected savings reduces the expected savings to $2.4 billion; see 
D. THE CEC INCORRECTLY ASSUMES ZERO COST OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS
The fourth major flaw in the CEC analysis is the assertion that the cost of compliance -that is the cost to consumers of the proposed regulation, setting aside energy efficiencies -is zero. The CEC's support for this claim is simply that compliant models currently exist and that certain manufacturers and technology providers support the proposed regulation. Moreover, the CEC ignores economic principles and factual evidence indicating the contrary.
First, ceteris paribus, if manufacturers could satisfy demand (in terms of customerdemanded price/feature combinations) with models that are both more energy efficient and cheaper to the consumer they would already be doing so. The 39 Per confidential discussions with the manufacturer. 40 Per confidential discussions with the manufacturer.
economic gains would be divided between the supplier and the consumer resulting in economic improvement for both parties.
Second, current model prices reflect a number of factors including, among other things, supply and demand conditions, manufacturing and distribution costs, marginal cost, marginal revenue, and product quality and feature mixes. The mere existence of models which satisfy the proposed regulations does not address any of these issues. Simplistically, assume that the cost to the consumer can be divided into two components: 1) the increased cost from required components resulting in a higher marginal cost of production; and 2) increased prices resulting from reduced competition (or reduced supply). Were manufacturers able to produce these higher efficiency models at no cost they would already have done so. Consequently, there is no question that the regulations will remove some models from the marketthereby reducing competition. Even if the eliminated models are replaced by other models, the feature/quality/price mix will have been changed. Consequently there is no question that there will be some reduction in supply competition and prices will effectively move higher. Put more simply, the existence of less expensive energy inefficient models constrains the price of the efficient models.
Finally, setting aside actual economic principles, the CEC ignores actual evidence contradicting their zero cost assumption (e.g., projections of increased costs provided by Vizio, Best Buy and others). We recognize that the specific energy efficiency improvement percentages resulting from competition and the increased consumer cost figures may be disputed by the CEC. There can be little doubt, however, that some combination of these two factors needs to be addressed by the CEC.
In our opinion, a cost increase of $17 is highly likely to be exceeded should the regulations be put into effect. Consequently, the proposed regulations are likely to be consumer net-negative.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, the CEC fails to prove that the proposed regulations are consumer neutral. Rather, the evidence seems to indicate, to the contrary, that consumers will suffer from increased overall costs and potentially reduced access to future innovations and technologies. As such, we believe that the CEC regulation will violate Section 25402(c) of the California Public Resources Code.
To the extent that other States consider adopting similar regulations, their respective legislative bodies and regulatory agencies should be aware of the flaws and shortcomings of the CEC analyses proffered in support of the California regulation. 
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We conclude by noting that regulatory-free competition in DTVs has resulted, and should continue to result, in significant energy efficiency improvements over time.
For example, under Energy Star Version 5.0, the maximum power consumption allowance for a 50" television or larger would be slightly more than a single 100 watt light bulb.
43 43 See Energy Star 5.0 Requirements: http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=tv_vcr.pr_crit_tv_vcr. Televisions with screen areas greater than 1068 square inches (equivalent to a screen size of 50 inches) have a maximum on mode power consumption of 108 watts.
